SAFETY BOARD DETERMINES 2006 MASSACHUSETTS FERRY FIRE CAUSED BY DIESEL FUEL CONTACT WITH HOT ENGINE SURFACE
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Washington, DC - The National Transportation Safety Board
determines that the probable cause of the fire on board the
small passenger vessel Massachusetts was the ignition of
diesel fuel by contact with a hot engine surface, which
occurred because a fuel line attached to a fuel injector was
not properly connected during engine maintenance by a
contract mechanic.
Contributing to the extent of the damage was the absence of
a fixed fire detection and suppression system, which
precluded the crew from receiving timely notification of the
fire and which allowed the blaze to spread throughout the
engineroom.
On June 12, 2006 the Massachusetts, a commuter ferry
carrying 65 passengers and four crewmembers, was en-route
from Rowe's Wharf in Boston Harbor to Hingham, Massachusetts
when a fire broke out in the engineroom. All passengers
were safely transferred to the Laura, another commuter
vessel in the vicinity before a fireboat from the Boston
Fire Department's marine unit arrived. There were no
serious injuries or fatalities. Damage was estimated at
$800,000.
"The absence of a requirement for a fire detection and
suppression system aboard the Massachusetts put the vessel,
it passengers, and its crew at greater danger," said NTSB
Chairman Mark V. Rosenker. "This accident illustrates why
the Safety Board has previously made recommendations,
following its investigations of other engineroom fires, to
the Coast Guard for certain vessels to be fitted with fire
detection and suppression systems."
As a result of its investigation of this accident, the
Safety Board made the following recommendation:
To the U.S. Coast Guard
Require that all passenger vessels certified to carry
more than 49 passengers, regardless of date of build
or hull material, be fitted with an approved fire
detection system and a fixed fire suppression system
in enginerooms.
This new recommendation supersedes the previous
recommendations (M-026 and M-02-8) and closes those
recommendations "Unacceptable Action-- Superseded."
A summary of the Board's report, including the probable
cause and safety recommendations, is available on the
Board's website,
www.ntsb.gov
